Classical Prose
六国论
苏洵
六国破灭，非兵不利，战不善，弊在赂秦。
赂秦而力亏，破灭之道也。或曰：六国互丧，率赂秦耶？曰：不赂者以赂者丧。盖失强援，不能独完。故曰：弊在赂秦也。
秦以攻取之外，小则获邑，大则得城。较秦之所得，与战胜而得者，其实百倍；诸侯之所亡，与战败而亡者，其实亦百倍。则秦之所大欲，诸侯之所大患，固不在战矣。
思厥先祖父，暴霜露，斩荆棘，以有尺寸之地。子孙视之不甚惜，举以予人，如弃草芥。今日割五城，明日割十城，然后得一夕安寝。起视四境，而秦兵又至矣。
然则诸侯之地有限，暴秦之欲无厌，奉之弥繁，侵之愈急。故不战而强弱胜负已判矣。至于颠覆，理固宜然。
古人云：“以地事秦，犹抱薪救火，薪不尽，火不灭。”此言得之。
齐人未尝赂秦，终继五国迁灭，何哉？与嬴而不助五国也。五国既丧，齐亦不免矣。
燕赵之君，始有远略，能守其土，义不赂秦。是故燕虽小国而后亡，斯用兵之效也。
至丹以荆卿为计，始速祸焉。赵尝五战于秦，二败而三胜。后秦击赵者再，李牧连却之。洎牧以谗诛，邯郸为郡，惜其用武而不终也。
且燕赵处秦革灭殆尽之际，可谓智力孤危，战败而亡，诚不得已。
向使三国各爱其地，齐人勿附于秦，刺客不行，良将犹在，则胜负之数，存亡之理，当与秦相较，或未易量。
呜呼！以赂秦之地封天下之谋臣，以事秦之心礼天下之奇才，并力西向，则吾恐秦人食之不得下咽也。
悲夫！有如此之势，而为秦人积威之所劫，日削月割，以趋于亡。为国者无使为积威之所劫哉！
夫六国与秦皆诸侯，其势弱于秦，而犹有可以不赂而胜之之势。苟以天下之大，下而从六国破亡之故事，是又在六国下矣。
Translation
The Six States perished not because their weapons were dull or their armies poorly led. The root of their failure lay in bribing Qin with land. By yielding land to Qin, they weakened their own strength; this was the road to destruction. Some may ask: since the Six States fell one after another, were they all guilty of bribing Qin? The answer is: even those that did not bribe Qin were destroyed because others did. Having lost strong allies, they could no longer preserve themselves alone. Thus the true evil lay in bribing Qin. Apart from what Qin seized by force, it gained towns in small portions and cities in great ones. Compared with what Qin won through battle, what it gained through cession was in fact a hundred times greater. What the feudal lords lost by cession was likewise a hundred times greater than what they lost in defeat. Therefore what Qin most desired, and what the lords most feared, had already moved beyond the battlefield. Think of their forefathers: braving frost and dew, cutting through thorns and brambles, they won even the smallest measure of land with hardship. Their descendants did not cherish it; they handed it over to others as if casting away weeds. Today they ceded five cities; tomorrow ten more. Only then could they sleep one night in peace. Yet when they rose and looked to the borders, Qin’s armies had arrived again. The land of the lords was limited, while violent Qin’s desire knew no satisfaction. The more they offered, the more urgently Qin pressed upon them. Thus, without battle, strength and weakness, victory and defeat, had already been decided. Their final collapse was only natural. The ancients said: “To serve Qin with land is like carrying firewood to put out a fire; as long as the wood remains, the fire will not die.” This saying is true. Qi never bribed Qin, yet in the end it followed the five states into ruin. Why? Because it sided with Qin and did not aid the others. Once the five states had fallen, Qi could not escape. The rulers of Yan and Zhao at first had far-sighted plans. They could defend their lands and refused, on principle, to bribe Qin. Therefore Yan, though a small state, perished later; this was the effect of armed resistance. But when Crown Prince Dan took Jing Ke’s assassination attempt as his strategy, disaster began. Zhao fought Qin five times, losing twice and winning three times. Later, when Qin attacked Zhao twice more, Li Mu repeatedly drove it back. After Li Mu was killed through slander, Handan became a Qin commandery. It is a pity that Zhao’s military resistance was not carried through to the end. Moreover, Yan and Zhao stood at a time when Qin had nearly swept away all the other states. Their wisdom and strength were isolated and endangered; if they fell in battle, it was truly because they had no choice. Had the three states cherished their lands, had Qi not attached itself to Qin, had the assassin not gone, had the good general remained alive, then the balance of victory and defeat, survival and destruction, when measured against Qin, might not have been easy to determine. Alas! If the lands used to bribe Qin had been used to reward the world’s strategists, if the reverence shown to Qin had been used to honor the world’s extraordinary talents, and if all had joined their strength facing west, I fear the people of Qin would not have been able to swallow their food. How tragic! With such a position, they were coerced by Qin’s accumulated power, cut down day by day and month by month, until they hastened toward destruction. Let those who govern a state never be coerced by accumulated power! The Six States and Qin were all feudal states. Though weaker than Qin, they still had the possibility of defeating it without bribery. If a great realm, vast as all-under-heaven, should lower itself and repeat the old story of the Six States’ ruin, it would be beneath even the Six States.
Analysis
Su Xun’s “On the Six States” is one of the most forceful political essays of the Northern Song. On the surface, it explains why the Six States of the Warring States period were destroyed by Qin. Beneath that historical argument lies a warning to Su Xun’s own age: a state that seeks peace by yielding to a stronger power may purchase only a brief sleep before a deeper ruin. The opening sentence is deliberately uncompromising. The Six States did not fall because their weapons were poor or their military skill deficient; their fatal error lay in bribing Qin. By beginning with a sharply stated thesis, Su Xun turns history into a political lesson. The issue is not merely military strength, but strategic will. Once land is surrendered in exchange for temporary safety, the weaker states lose both material ground and moral resistance. The essay’s central logic is expressed in the contrast between finite land and infinite appetite. The feudal lords’ territories were limited, but Qin’s desire was insatiable. Each concession bought only a short peace and encouraged further pressure. The image of “carrying firewood to put out a fire” gives the argument memorable force: the very means chosen to stop danger becomes fuel for it. Su Xun also distinguishes among the states, which gives the essay historical depth. Qi did not bribe Qin, yet it perished because it sided with Qin and refused to aid the others. Yan and Zhao resisted and therefore fell later, though their later mistakes—especially the assassination attempt by Jing Ke and the killing of Li Mu—helped hasten their destruction. These examples show that collapse came not from one cause alone, but from failed alliances, fear of power, misuse of talent, and the abandonment of collective resistance. The final warning, “Let those who govern a state never be coerced by accumulated power,” reveals the essay’s deeper purpose. Su Xun is not writing antiquarian history. He is warning rulers of his own time not to repeat the Six States’ path. The essay’s style is austere, urgent, and cumulative. Its short judgments strike like verdicts; its longer parallel passages gather emotional force. This combination of historical analysis and political passion makes the work one of the classic models of argumentative prose.
About the Author
Su Xun was a Northern Song prose writer from Meishan in present-day Sichuan. Together with his sons Su Shi and Su Zhe, he is known as one of the “Three Sus,” and he is also counted among the Eight Great Prose Masters of the Tang and Song. Su Xun was especially strong in historical and political essays. His prose is vigorous, direct, and argumentative, often drawing lessons from the rise and fall of earlier states. “On the Six States” is one of his most famous works, using the destruction of the Warring States powers as a warning against appeasement and political weakness.